5. The Political Framework
i) Brief background summary: The Fujimori Years
After the deep economic and social crisis of the years from 1985 to 1990, the general elections (8 April, 1990) brought a confrontation between the candidate Mario Vargas Llosa of the FREDEMO alliance and Alberto Fujimori as exponent of the Cambio 90 group. Vargas Llosa obtained the largest percentage of the total votes cast but failed to attain the required absolute majority. In a second round, Fujimori emerged with 57% of the votes cast, having attracted late support from left-wing parties and from APRA (inauguration: 28 July 1990).
The first years (1994-97) of the Fujimori presidency were marked by a successful stabilisation program, market-oriented reforms and an important foreign investment inflow. The continuously growing presence of armed terrorism (Sendero Luminoso and MRTA) was gradually brought under control by co-ordinating governmental action more and more with the Armed Forces and the security apparatus, thus increasingly relying on an authoritarian style of government and allowing for a gradual "power-outsourcing" to an intermediary network led by security chief Vladimiro Montesinos.
Constitutional developments followed this turn towards authoritarianism: a new organism (CCD) was set up in 1992 to present a draft constitution which enhanced presidential power, provided for the establishment of a unicameral legislature with a reduced number of deputies (120) and for the possibility of a successive five-year term of office for the President of the Republic (the Constitution was approved by CCD in September 1993 and by a subsequent special referendum which obtained 52.2% of cast votes in favour of the proposal).
This set of measures, coupled with a high reliance on emergency legislation, has come to be characterised as Fujimori's "autogolpe" (i.e. a self-instigated putsch) which paved the way for well-orchestrated presidential and legislative elections in April 1995. It is being argued that even the border conflict with Ecuador in early 1995 was timed as to create the necessary cross-party consensus favourable to the government. In fact, Fujimori defeated his closest opponent, Pérez de Cuéllar, winning 64% and a 67:53 majority of seats in Congress.
ii) The situation in 2000
Under the impression of the beginning decline of the economic system and the erosion of popular support in early 1997, the government hardened its grip by manipulating the judiciary and began preparing for the second re-election campaign (dismissal by Congress of three critical Tribunal Constitutional Justices), so that a docile TC (February 98) then opened the way for a third term candidature in 2000. After a defeated referendum motion presented by the opposition on the question of Fujimori's re-eligibility (September 1998), the government tried to contain mounting public protest through greatly increased spending on social welfare programs during the run-up to the 2000 elections. By effectively buying votes in this manner, the President's "popularity" increased so that he obtained the largest number of votes, but not an absolute majority. During the pre-campaign period, a growing number of complaints regarding serious election irregularities were lodged with the national electoral commission. Because of these irregularities, observed by both independent domestic civic organisations like Transparencia and international observer groups, the main electoral contender, Alejandro Toledo, refused to present himself for a second round of elections, which were held on 28 May 2000. Despite complaints of several countries and organisations, including the European Union, this second round of the elections went ahead. The EU and the other major observation groups decided not to be present with observers during the second round, which Mr. Fujimori won in the absence of any opposition.
Upon initiative of the Ombudsman's Office, the OAS was approached for assistance in re-instituting a democratic process of interaction between opposition and government, with participation of a broad range of associations from the civil society. A high-level OAS mission became instrumental in setting up and moderating the planned round table (Mesa de Diálogo y Concertación Para el Fortalecimiento de la Democracia en el Perú). This mesa de diálogo was installed 25 August to debate an agenda of 29 subject areas, with the aim of presenting conclusions not later than 30 March 2001. The original idea to set the stage for another referendum under a new set of legal rules was abandoned. Before the meetings even began, the resulting public pressure opened the floodgates; two sensational disclosures happened nearly simultaneously:
· President Fujimori was forced to admit the existence of a Peruvian military network of arms traffic between Jordan and the Colombian FARC irregulars;
· and in September 2000, the first surprise videotape of a whole collection filmed in the offices of Montesinos appeared in public, documenting bribery transactions by the "éminence grise" of the regime which implicate senior political figures.
This started the decisive "vladivideo scandal" that then unleashed a sequence of events which have cracked the structure of the regime and plunged the country into long-lasting imbalance. These circumstances were:
· the hasty departure of Montesinos (23 September 2000);
· the President's announcement of a reduction of his mandate, combined with his call for new elections in 2001 (8 April);
· the disbandment of the National Intelligence Service (SIN);
· Fujimori's departure to Southeast Asia and eventually to his asylum in Japan;
· Finally his impeachment by Congress on 21 November 2000.
Mr. Valentín Paniagua, president of Congress, was subsequently chosen by Parliament as provisional president of the Republic. The electoral schedule, as set by the previous government, was upheld; brief deliberations about extending the transitional period to a two-year term were not followed up. Paniagua assembled a caretaker government to rule Peru until the new president and government, resulting from the election, would take over on 28 July 2001.
The new cabinet is a mixture of technocrats, experienced politicians and notable figures including the former UN Secretary General Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who was appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The main objectives of this transitional government have been to organize free and fair presidential and congressional elections, and to pursue as much political reform as advisable and possible, while maintaining economic stability. Despite the old composition of Congress (with a strong Cambio 90 fraction still in place), the administration has succeeded in making the electoral bodies more independent, renewing around 78% of the staff of ONPE. Media access and freedom of expression have been re-established. This measured course of well-chosen steps to regulate by executive orders has been followed up to the new elections. In this context has to be seen the decision, taken in April 2001, to replace the entire corps of the 194 heads of the provincial administrations (subprefectos) who had been appointed under the previous regime. Another proof of the careful stride this government has been taking is the solution found in tackling the problem of effecting changes in the military high command structure and the purge of the judiciary of some elements known to have been close to the Fujimori government. Most significant was that the Armed Forces, in a declaration of loyalty to the political authorities, presented a confession of guilt for their close involvement with the past regime and asked for public exoneration.
To place this transitional phase in full perspective, one will also have to mention the decisive changes effected, since the departure of ex-president Fujimori, with respect to human rights. The transitional government has assumed a clear position of recognising and respecting the fundamental rights and has placed the preparations and arrangements for the new elections squarely within this perspective. This had as a premise the recognition and acceptance by Peru of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as represented by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee which had been highly critical about the former regime. The Fujimori government had therefore discontinued Peru's membership in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Unequivocally positive consequences on the domestic scene have also been noted in the observance of human rights, the latest and very important decision being the creation by presidential decree (22 May) of the long-debated Truth Commission (Comisión de la Verdad). The commission is to begin working in August 2001 and its mandate is for eighteen months. An understanding has been reached that the entire 20-year phase since 1980 will come under scrutiny as to violations both by the terrorist groups and the counter-insurgency forces.
On the domestic scene, one institution - the Ombudsman's Office (Defensoría del Pueblo / DP) - has gained considerable influence since the year 2000, although created much earlier (constitution of 1993, art. 161, 203 et al.). Not bestowed with autonomous executive powers, the Ombudsman commands high moral authority and public pressure potential vis a vis all public institutions and official entities. Through its eight regional representations, the agency receives, and acts upon, complaints concerning legal or administrative abuses and infringements. Since the agency also has the mandate to supervise the elections to the effect of guaranteeing full participation and the free exercise of political rights, frequently mention is made of the DP in this mission's report. As reflected in various passages relative to electoral rights in this report, also the Tribunal Supremo Constitucional has increasingly devoted its line of decision-making to human rights issues, although previously having been curtailed by the former regime.
iii) The Position of the European Union
The EU has been closely monitoring the evolution of the Peruvian situation over the past years and in particular has supported the OAS-sponsored "mesa de diálogo". Since the announcement of new elections, the EU, recognising a window of opportunity, has shown its satisfaction and support. This can be illustrated by two successive EU declarations on 20 Sept. and 20 Nov 2000. Once more, the EU reiterated its full accord with the efforts made by the OAS in support of the democratisation of the Peruvian system. This is also the position adopted by the European Parliament (6 Oct. 2000) which "calls on the Commission to undertake a special program in order to give active support to this new phase of the democratic process in Peru and to co-ordinate the initiatives taken by Member States".
The EU has welcomed the recent events that have taken place in Peru following the departure of President Fujimori, in particular with respect to the mechanisms foreseen in the Constitution, and has also welcomed the political maturity shown by the people of Peru. In recognition of this new situation, President Prodi replied positively to the letter from the Peruvian government inviting the EU to send an electoral observation mission to cover the elections to be held in April / June 2001.
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