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7.
The Pre-Election Phases
i)
Performance and co-ordination of the Electoral Agencies
Before
the arrival of the EOM-EU, the staff for the Subsidiary Electoral
Tribunals (Jurados Electorales
Especiales / JEE) and for polling stations (Mesas
de Sufragio / MsS) had already been selected by draw (sorteo)
from among the voting citizens. This is an important phase within the
electoral organisation on the practical execution of which the mission
was not able to receive much information from electoral institutions.
In
various regions voters complained that inadequate JEE staff, or
personnel recruited under undue influence-peddling, had been
maintained for the second round, and that in general, the selections
had been made without the necessary transparency. In such cases, the
voting public has considerable difficulties in lodging official
complaints. In some places, the contested nominees exerted political
pressure. And – more importantly – such complaints are conditioned
upon the deposit of a bond sum, which is forfeited in case of
impugnment.
The
National Jury for Elections (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones / JNE) and the State Office for
Electoral Processes (Oficina
Nacional de Procesos Electorales / ONPE) renewed their staff
members at all levels, especially at higher ones. This has meant
highly increased activities at both institutions, notably ONPE. JNE
started a systematic supervision, which it had not put into practice
before. ONPE was not satisfied with this supervision because it
implied constant and tedious remittal of information about their
activities. Furthermore, it was doubted whether the JNE had any
competence in supervisory matters, apart from a jurisdictional one a
posteriori by petition of interested party. The conflict was
solved through private agreements during the month of May, which
allowed for supervision to be carried out.
Unlike
JNE, ONPE was also subject to electoral supervision by the
Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría
del Pueblo / DP) and even agreed to allow offices for voters’
defence (Defensoría del
Elector) to be set up in the Regional Offices for Electoral
Processes (Oficinas Departamentales de Procesos Electorales / ODPE). JNE and
ONPE coincided in being hospitable but at the same time not very
accessible to election observation missions.
ONPE
faced a serious software problem. Before the EOM-EU arrived,
concession for the electoral software had been awarded to a company
that later on proved not to be fully up to the expectations of
competence in these matters. The software program was not suitable for
electoral purposes, and this became a major issue before the first
round of the parliamentary and presidential elections. ONPE, OAS and
the international agencies of direct technical and/or financial
support (UNO, IFES, CAPEL) disregarded the problem, and ONPE feigned a
successful trial run of the elections (trial runs are, since 2000,
obligatory by law). The EOM-EU decided to issue a cautious information
about these findings. In the end, this “European mediation” proved
to be helpful in view of the fact that alarming comments about the
problem had already spread among the political representatives (personeros).
The EU Core Team, for these specific problems, would have appreciated
the presence of a computer system specialist within its group, even if
for a limited period of time.
Even
though JNE was aware of the situation, its supervisory role was not
brought to bear in any significant form. After a series of adjustments
and upgrading, the software worked well on polling day but was then
discarded by ONPE. After the incident, the ONPE staff seemed to be
distrustful of the EOM-EU for not having co-operated in concealing a
problem that might have ruined its good performance in other respects
and during the election itself. Apart from this, however, ONPE has
proved to be capable and efficient in handling all other technical and
operational aspects during the preparatory stages.
Between
the two rounds, the dormant conflict between JNE and ONPE welled up
once more. JNE’s delay in dealing with contestations impeded ONPE,
which had already decided to change the software, from substituting it
as the servers were still
being used to input data of definite resolutions of pending challenges
from the first round. There was also an ongoing discussion on the
regional level between the JEE and the ODPE over some documents
because, literally, neither jurists nor technicians understood each
other’s language.
Another
problem of some importance that arose between JNE and ONPE before the
second round was the decision to introduce a system of accelerated
collection of voting records (Acopio
Rápido de Actas / ACRA). It had been created by ONPE as a kind of
selective rapid count (directing a speedy transhipment of the
respective copy of the records from all easily accessible voting
stations, to accelerate tally by not waiting for the collection from
all centres to be completed first). A few days before the second
round, this practice was prohibited by JNE, but on the day before
polling day, both institutions discreetly came to an agreement: JNE
would not rescind its order, but ONPE was informally permitted to
carry out the speedy collection of results.
The
duties of the National Identity and Civil Status Registry (Registro
Nacional de Identidad y Estado Civil / RENIEC) are carried out
before the electoral process whereas those of the JNE are subsequent
to it. These two issues, especially citizen registry and electoral
jurisdiction, will be taken up in another context. We will also
examine the electoral supervision of the DP, to which reference has
already been made.
ii)
Registration of Parties and Candidates
The
electoral reform of 1997 introduced modifications as to the time limit
set for the inscription of political organisations and candidates, for
their inclusion in the electoral lists (LOE, effective first for the
2000 election and still valid for the electoral process in 2001):
(1)
The convocation deadline for the elections was reduced from 240
days before, to a time frame between 150 and 120 days before E-day;
(2)
The inscription of organisations and of presidential candidates
is now open until 90 days before E-day (formerly: 180 days before);
(3)
The inscription of deputy candidacies is now open until 60 days
before E-day (formerly 90 days).
While
these amendments lend more freedom of action to political groups in
organising themselves, they tend to concentrate and shorten the
pre-electoral process. In the same context, requirements for the
inscription of political organisations were tightened:
·
Art. 87,
88b LOE set basically a twofold limit to the inscription; namely proof
of the adhesion of at least 4% of the electorate; and the elimination
of the party or political group from the register if and when it fails
to obtain at least 5% of the votes in a general election.
While
the 5 percent clause has become a recognised part of international
party legislation, applied in various countries, the minimum number of
members or affiliates does not seem reasonable under the given
Peruvian conditions (not surprisingly, in the 2000 elections, this
turned out to be one of the most contested aspects, given the high
number of unverifiable signatures). A modification of this point is
advisable.
After
the current elections, a dilemma is certain to arrive, as some parties
have obtained a seat in congress but remained below the 5% threshold
in their countrywide results, so that their organisations will have to
be struck from the register for future elections.
Under these conditions,
finally eight party lists with candidates for the presidency qualified
and postulated for the elections. Most of them are lists and alliances
newly formed during the last Fujimori years, having only scant
identification with some of the traditional Peruvian party structures
which had fallen into disarray.
·
Peru
Posible
(candidate: Alejandro Toledo Manrique), a party of centre/left
definition, but with an essentially market-economy program, partly
guaranteed by the adhesion of parts of the old liberal Acción
Popular. Main programmatic focal points: Work creation programs;
foreign investment in agriculture; tourism; mining; public housing
projects.
·
Partido
Aprista Peruano / APRA (
candidate: Alan García Pérez), the most traditional of existing
political organisations, of leftist social-democratic tradition, in
government during the term 1985/90. Main programmatic points:
Re-negotiation of foreign debt; nationalised agrarian credit; price
control of public transport; regional political decentralisation of
the country.
·
Unidad
Nacional (candidate:
Ma Lourdes Flores Nano) a liberal, centre/right formation
which has integrated parts of the traditional Christian Social Party.
Three major program areas: Agricultural development with concentration
on specialised export crops; development of industrial free trade
zones (maquiladoras);
infrastructure development. Increased foreign investment in most of
these areas.
·
Frente
Independiente Moralizador (candidate:
Fernando Olivera Vega), a liberal, market-economy oriented group
around (former Fujimori government minister) Mr. Olivera, advocating
tax and import duty reductions to foment the agrarian export economy;
goal: debt service reduction and 7% annual sustained growth of BIP.
The
other four contending parties were:
·
Solución
Popular
(candidate: Carlos Bolonà Behr); foreign investment and free market
economy oriented; strong ties to the industrial sector.
·
Projecto
País
(candidate: Marco Arrunátegui C.); recently formed group representing
sectors of small industry and transport services
·
Renacimiento
Andino (candidate:
Ciro Galvez Herrera), recently formed group with strong regional
affiliation. Priorities seen in agro-industrial development, fishery
and mining investment.
·
Todos
por la Victoria (candidate :
Ricardo Noriega Salaverry); recently formed group with similar
programmatic plans as Solución Popular and Renacimiento Andino.
Apart
from the race for the presidential election on 8 April, five more
party lists entered candidates either countrywide or in selected
electoral regions, for the parliamentary election. These were
·
Cambio
90 - Nueva Mayoria;
Movimiento Somos Peru;
Union por el Peru/Socialismo
Democratico (UPP/SI); Partido
Acción Popular; Frente
Popular Agricola F/A (FREPAP)
,
so that 13 political groups
were represented in the race for congressional seats (cf.: section
9.ii for the results obtained in the congressional votes.)
iii)
Voter and Civic Education
The
mission’s field observers, deployed throughout the four corners of
the country, were able to confirm that civic and electoral training
activities were mainly executed by ONPE, JNE, the Ombudsman’s
Office, Transparencia and, in a lesser degree, by PROMUDEH and the
Catholic Church. Activities of the first entities mentioned were
mainly focused on training polling station members and the population
of rural communities. Work made during the first round centred on
promoting understanding of the organisational aspects (mainly the
difficulties presented by the unified ballot-sheet for president and
for congress). This aspect had become more complicated due to the
multiple district system used for the congressional vote and the
option for a preferential vote.
Before
the run-off election, ONPE evaluated the competence and training level
of its staff members in order to design a new training methodology.
However, the distribution of printed electoral material in native
languages, particularly for voters of the Quechua and Aymara regions,
was all but non-existent.
Apart
from the fact that these other languages are used by a significant
number of the rural population, it was noted that the citizenship
training material was modified just before the run-off date omitting
all reference in the material for the rural population to the
possibility, but also the drawbacks of a blank vote. By contrast, such
explanations did appear in the material aimed at the urban population.
ONPE
developed the widest coverage of voter education activities and it was
the entity that invested most funds for this purpose. In this context,
the agency’s priorities were aimed, in order of importance, firstly
at the training of its local staff, secondly at political party
representatives, and finally at the citizenry at large.
iv)
Media and the Elections
Media
access and Media Campaign
Peru
has a diverse electronic and printed media landscape. Along with the
three state-owned media (a TV channel, a radio station and a
newspaper), a high number of privately owned media guarantee that the
public can receive information from a wide variety of sources with
differing political and social perspectives. The campaign in the media
was generally well conducted and the media provided equal access and
balanced coverage for all candidates.
In
general terms, the behaviour of the media differed clearly from what
could be observed during the campaign of 2000. The first part of the
2001 campaign was almost completely dominated by the issue of the so
called “Vladivideos” (tapes where the former factotum of the ex-President Fujimori, Vladimiro Montesinos, showed
himself in the act of bribing a number of relevant representatives of
the past regime). The tapes have been made public in dribs and drabs
and contributed to heighten a climate of tension and to raise
unrealistic expectation or fears among both politicians and the voting
public.
On
the other hand, the main and most trusted newspapers and, in general,
TV and Radio stations, covered, in a very balanced manner, the
activities and programs of all candidates, focusing however, during
the campaign for the first election date, more attention upon the main
four contenders. It was clear that the debate on programs was
conducted unequally by the media. The communications strategy chosen
by many of the media, as well as by certain candidates themselves,
generally placed emphasis on news that contained little analysis of
programmatic proposals.
During
the second round of the presidential election campaign, the media
distinguished themselves by granting more space to pluralist
principles. As a result, both candidates were able to make their ideas
and programs more widely known to the public. Press and TV monitoring
showed that both candidates were accorded remarkably balanced
treatment. After long discussions, the two candidates finally agreed
to have a public TV debate (19 May). Toledo and García settled for
the presence of four journalists and one moderator; the debate was
filmed by the State TV and broadcast live by the State radio station,
but all other TV and radio channels were free to retransmit it live.
General expectations reached a high pitch in the days immediately
before the event, all media and the entire country eagerly awaiting
the debate. The newspapers, of course, covered the event with plenty
of articles, reviews, commentaries and special sections. Even though
it was organised under extremely strict rules, in compliance with an
agreement (“Pacto”)
signed by the political parties themselves, the debate proved to be an
important democratic experience. It did enable the public to gain a
clearer idea about the candidates’ proposals before the second and
final round.
After
the debate between the two candidates, the electoral campaign in the
media recovered quickly, even increasing in acrimony, to the level of
personal attacks and muck-raking (guerra sucia). The media, in this context, were not simply the
means of communicating negative messages, but in turn became
themselves one of the arguments used to attack the political opponent.
Costs of the electoral
campaign in the media
Transparencia
presented (19 April) an analysis estimating the expenses of all the
political parties for electoral advertising in the mass media during
the first turn of the election. They monitored, under contract with
agency Media Check S.A.C., 9 TV channels, 11 radio stations and 14
newspapers between 8 January (the first day after the end of the
inscription to the presidential elections) and 6 April (last day
permitted for published political propaganda). The data (see annex)
are only indicative, but give an approximate idea of the amounts
invested in the media by all candidates/political groups.
The
Candidate who spent most during the first part of the campaign was Mr.
Toledo with 34,6% (2,240,179.83 USD) of the total expenditure by all
parties; it is worth to be noted that Mr. Garcia, the other candidate
in the run-off, is only in fifth position with 9,67% (624,797.30 USD)
of the total. During the first round, 90,7% of the money spent by all
the parties and candidates was used to advertise on television; only
6,7% went to radio channels and 2,6% to the newspapers.
v)
The electoral campaign
As
the campaign for the decisive electoral contest (presidential and
parliamentary elections on 8 April) entered its first full month, the
essential elements for fair voting conditions were basically being
respected throughout the country. The entire campaign, though, came
under the influence of the so-called “vladivideos” revelations:
the piece-meal offerings to the media of tape passages of bribery and
political machinations by former presidential advisor Vladimiro
Montesinos thus became a powerful instrument in destroying or
favouring certain candidates.
While
initially 11 party lists had been presented for the presidential
contest, during the preparations for the ballot sheets to be printed,
the spectrum shrunk to 8 contenders as three groups withdrew their
candidates from the contest.
Generally
speaking, political campaigning for the first round, as well as for
the second, decisive presidential vote (3 June) has been carried out
under well-established domestic and international monitoring which has
permitted that the essential elements for fair voting conditions were
maintained for the entire duration of the lengthy process, as there
are freedom of assembly and free speech, free access of all political
groups to the media, wide media coverage, and perfect freedom of
movement. Also, the campaign was accompanied by a sequence of well-publicised
opinion polls, carried out by the six major professional or academic
survey research centres of the country. Above all, however, it is to
be emphasised that the current government under President Paniagua has
scrupulously maintained a perfect posture of neutrality, avoiding even
the slightest impression of taking advantage of its policy measures to
bolster their image in a way that might have influenced the vote.
Nevertheless,
this does not mean that the contest was maintained throughout on a
level of fairness and moderation. Early on, a concentration of public
preferences became manifest, with the three most popular candidates
emerging (Ms. Flores, M. Toledo, and M. Garcia), and M. Olivera as an
additional possibility. As a consequence, the campaign early in March
took on more and more “populist” overtones, with a competition
among candidates for far-flung job creation promises, local investment
prospects and the like.
A
month of intensive party rallies, first in the hinterland provinces,
then in the Metropolitan area, produced some disturbances; the “Pacto” of mutual fair treatment the parties had signed was at this
time variously called questionable and “broken up in pieces”, but
in fact no really dangerous breaches occurred. During rivalling mass
rallies, both parties were even visibly willing and able to restrain
their fans from any confrontation.
Thus,
by and large, the campaign was characterised by a remarkably normal
course of events, until the end of March, when a sudden turn into the
long-predicted slander and muck-raking phase (“guerra
sucia”) was brought on. The overall political climate became
charged with mutual recriminations, disdain and ill will, unclear or
dubious details of the candidates’ private lives being thrown into
the arena. For the first time in memory, racial slurs were brought
into the vote issue, pitting the allegiance of the highland
populations against the strongholds of coastal dwellers who had so far
been dominating the political fate of the country.
Despite
a program-oriented telephone/radio debate between Toledo and Flores, a
few days before voting day, the entire pre-electoral period was marked
by what may be termed a “debate stalemate”, for want of direct
public confrontations between the candidates on program issues. The
sharpest disputes, at this stage, concentrated on an indirect exchange
of accusations and “revelations” between the Toledo and Flores
camps. The APRA-candidate Alan Garcia was the main beneficiary of the
mud-slinging during this interval, which permitted him to settle back
in the role of a less-concerned “arbiter”, a fact which helped
enhance his public backing, to the point of being able to surpass Ms.
Flores by 1.5 percentage points in the contest for the second place in
the run-off.
After
the April vote, the complicated congressional balloting system,
ensuing contestations, and failures in the computerised counting
system delayed the proclamation of definite official results, and of
the date for the run-off, for an unusually long time (until 22 May).
After an initial lull, the long wait generated growing public
scepticism, uncertainty and mease.
With
the campaign tempo speeding up again in May, three major issues began
to dominate the political discussion before the run-off:
·
Increasing public pressure was becoming felt for
the two candidates to finally consent to a public (TV) debate on their
policy issues (the event turned out to be a relatively successful and
valid exercise in democratic behaviour, which the country, after the
decade of autocratic rule, had been waiting for).
·
A new wave in the denigration campaign (“guerra
sucia”), this time mainly directed against APRA candidate
Garcia, was based partly on slander about private life aspects but
mainly on Garcia’s prior performance as president of the republic.
·
Major public concern and debate dwelled up about
survey data that showed an increasing protest vote, in the form of an
increasing number of voter intentions to abstain from the elections or
present a blank or void ballot. (This trend had led to an alarming
proportion of about 32% blank/void votes countrywide, with
Metropolitan Lima leading with approx. 40%. The reasons behind this
tendency were apparently: a degree of disappointment with both
candidates still “available”; and the absence of a true
alternative on the centre/right side of the political spectrum).
The
result of the long-awaited run-off on 3 June has been an undisputed,
if slim victory for Peru Posible and president-elect Alejandro Toledo,
who – without a majority of seats in congress of his own - will have
to form a government on the basis of a loose coalition with various
smaller forces in order to guarantee a stable government after being
sworn in on 28 July.
vi)
The electoral observation by the European Union Mission
In
need of updated and first hand information, which national observation
groups usually possess, the international missions have to make great
efforts in short time to gain the necessary background information.
Due to this, the missions develop their particular strategy, technique
and their own mode of public appearance. In this chapter we try to
present our own case and the mission’s tasks in order to facilitate
a fair evaluation of our endeavour.
On
the managerial side, the mission had a different set of tasks for the
pre-electoral period and for the election base. The Core Team focused
its area of responsibility on liasing with the national directorial
and political institutions and the other observer units, and
maintained a constant flux of information to the European Commission
via a weekly information bulletin covering all aspects of electoral
developments and mission activities. The long-term observers (LTO), on
their part, organised pre-electoral observation in their regional
areas while preparing also the logistics for the deployment of the
larger short-term teams. Voting procedures on the two polling days
were then to be monitored by the European short-term contingents and
the additional group of observers appointed by the European
Parliament, both of these groups arriving shortly to the election
days.
Long-term
observation
In
consonance with the experience accumulated from previous observation
missions carried out by the European Union, the terms of reference
assigned to the observers a wide list of questions which were to be
dealt with in weekly reports to the mission headquarter in Lima. These
areas of observation were:
·
Electoral
campaign: LTO
were to attend party rallies carried out by candidates both for the
presidency and congress, taking into account the structure and content
of their messages, and follow up the house-to-house campaign during
the first round by the parliamentary candidates. Observers were also
instructed to approach the political parties and gain information
about campaign expenses and funding as well as the conduct of the
campaign within the context of the general campaign principles and the
interests of the political group by which they had been nominated.
·
Civic
and voter education:
Here the observers were to determine the origin, extension and impact
of citizen and voter education campaigns carried out by the domestic
institutions. In this, they had to keep an eye on gender and language
group issues, the level of understanding of the electoral process, of
plurality in democracy and of the voting procedures and the secrecy
safeguards of the vote.
·
Safeguards
for the civil and political rights of the citizenry:
Observers were asked to monitor the existing guarantees for the
respect to freedom of speech, of movement and association, not only in
the political context but also in civil affairs. Special attention was
paid to any kind of intimidation, cases of political violence, as well
as to the attitude of the armed forces and of civil authorities.
·
Media
coverage of the electoral process:
Observers were to verify the fairness of access of all political
entities to the media, the extension of TV and radio broadcasts, as
well as the presence of state owned and private national and regional
media and their impact in the region. The focal point was to be the
treatment given by the press to the different candidates during the
first and the second pre-electoral phase and the attitude of
governmental and electoral authorities on the district level vis-à-vis
freedom of expression in the media.
·
Other
entities of electoral observation in their region:
Observers were asked to document the presence of other domestic and
international observer teams, to liase with them and co-ordinate
deployment wherever this was advisable and possible.
Above
and beyond this, during the entire duration of the mission, Core Team
and long-term observers in the field kept in close contact about all
topics that might be of such importance as to be suitable for final
recommendations.
The observers were also
expected to keep themselves informed about the wider perspectives of
the regional and local political situation, with particular interest
in differences between urban and rural areas and in the security
situation, with an eye upon any exceptional circumstances and events.
Short-term
observation
The
short-term observation teams had more specific tasks when compared
with the more analytical role of the long-term observers in their
respective areas of deployment. Their work was assigned more closely
to the legal rules and regulations foreseen in the LOE for the
electoral process itself. Manuals had been prepared to instruct the
observers on these issues, and observation tools (specific forms) had
been provided as check lists and observation pages for the various
parts of the procedure, i.e. for opening of the mesas,
the voting procedure during the day, for the closure of the electoral
boards and the counting and tabulation process. The Core Team had also
instructed the observers to be present at the ODPE computing centres,
to witness the computerised tabulation of the results gathered in the
electoral records under the supervision of their long-term observers.
The mediation of long-term observers has been essential in obtaining
the highest possible benefits in this particular aspect.
Other
observation methods employed by the Core Team
Over
and beyond these immediate concerns, the EU-EOM has been active in
extending their observation field by consulting with representatives
of social and corporative groups so as to gather information about the
electoral difficulties each of these sectors might have perceived. In
this context, a one-day seminar was organised (25 May) for indigenous
associations and communities, in co-operation with the Defensoría del
Pueblo (the Ombudsman Office). Additional support was obtained from
PROMUDEH (Ministry for Women Promotion and Human Development), the
Spanish International Co-operation Agency and hospitality was provided
by the civil association Transparencia.
Representatives of the above mentioned associations and communities,
both from the Sierra and the Selva areas presented and debated the
specific problems they are confronted with in the execution of their
political and electoral participation within their indigenous
environment and in their regions (cf. seminar conclusions, Annex).
The
relationship with other observation missions
As
described in a different context, other international organisations
were present in Peru during the pre-electoral and the observation
phases. With all of them the European mission established and
maintained good and close relations. This pertains above all to the
most important group from the Organisation of American States (OAS)
and the mission of the National Democratic Institute/Carter Centre,
but also to smaller observation missions as the one from the
International Legal Resources Centre of Quebec, Canada, and of CAPEL,
Costa Rica.
Within
this network of relations, the EU mission has maintained its
independence of responsibilities and of action, although prior to the
EOM arrival in Peru proposals had been made to form an “umbrella
arrangement” under the guidance of the OAS-mission; later,
suggestions of a tighter co-ordination/supervision emanated from the
group of European diplomatic representations in Peru. In view of such
suggestions the mission has attempted to plan, and carry out, its own
systematic observation work in terms of gathering, comparing and
interpreting legal, political and organisational aspects, in order to
arrive at its own assessment and conclusions.
The
Core Team is satisfied that our assessments have been recognised as
professionally serious, and that we were able to present them in a way
which may make them applicable in one or another practical context
during future considerations about Peruvian electoral legislation. We
feel confident to have gained credit in this respect, a credit, which
was also manifested by the other major actors in this process of
electoral observation. Various letters of recognition, among them one
from the OAS Head of Mission, were welcome proof of this
acknowledgement.
vii)
Domestic Observation of the Electoral Process
The
principal domestic electoral observation groups are, by order of
importance, the non-governmental organisations Transparencia,
Consejo por la Paz and the Instituto
de Estudios Electorales. The Defensoría del Pueblo (DP) falls
under this category as well, even though it is a public institution.
Transparencia, founded in 1994 as an asociación
civil, is a non-profit, non-governmental association in the field
of civic education, fostering knowledge and understanding of
democratic principles and is particularly active in monitoring voting
and public decision-making processes. The association relies heavily
on a widening network of national volunteers; it has received
international financing from the USA, the EU, the United Nations and
various national governmental organisations. Activities in electoral
monitoring have been carried out since the 1995 general elections and
have been continued during all following electoral events, including
the municipal polls of 1995, 1998 and 1999. During these events, Transparencia
had proved to be the organism attaining the widest coverage of all –
national or international – observation teams. It has established
194 co-ordination committees nation-wide. By virtue of attracting
large numbers of younger people to their volunteer service, the
organisation is making a notable contribution to enhance motivation
for civic affairs among the Peruvian youth. On the scientific and
technical level, the group has been able to apply, with substantial
Canadian technical assistance, qualified rapid-count procedures on
election day by relying on their large volunteer staff.
As
for Transparencia, it has
been publishing preliminary electoral results during polling day,
which have greatly contributed to maintaining public interest and to
the observance of a calm atmosphere of this transitional process.
Consejo por la Paz has other distinctive characteristics. It
has a more permanent deployment based on a corporate type network
among professional and gremial organisations. They usually conduct
observations in areas where the threat of terrorism has not yet
disappeared. The organisation is not only concerned about the good
development of the electoral process but to see to it that these
conditions are maintained.
The
Instituto
de Estudios Electorales is still in the implementation and
development stage but it shows a promising profile. It not only
stresses its observation capacity but it also encourages, through
aggressive advertising campaigns, the common citizen to involve
themselves in electoral vigilance of electoral acts. In any event, the
electoral process will indeed need wider citizen participation, from
the selection of mesa members to the vote count.
The
Ombudsman’s
Office (DP) is a special case. Although it is a public
institution established under the constitution, people perceive it
more as a non-government organisation or a civil organisation for the
defence of human rights. As political participation is considered one
of these rights, the DP has taken upon itself the “electoral
supervision” task. The JNE has not acknowledged so far this
attribution of the DP but it could not do anything about it. On the
other hand, the ONPE has been co-operating with the DP.
For
these elections, DP, Transparencia
and Consejo por la Paz have received economic support from the European
Union. It is worth pointing out that the three institutions were
throughout welcoming and helpful in their contacts with the EU-mission.
On the part of the three electoral institutions (JNE, ONPE, and RENIEC)
there was apparently some initial expectation that the European aid
should be destined directly to their own observation. Taking into
account past experiences of other observation teams, the MOE-EU feels
that to finance institutions being supervised might impede or hamper
an impartial assessment of electoral activities.
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