Table of Contents

1.      Introductory remarks
2.       Executive Summary     
3.       Peru: Statistical Country Profile     
4.       The European Observation Mission (EOM)      
5.       The Political Framework    
6.       The Legal Framework of Peruvian Elections     
   i)           The Constitutional and Legislative Framework
   ii)          Electoral rights and discriminations
   iii)        The Structure of the Electoral Administration
   iv)         Procedural provisions for the elections
   v)          Media Laws and Regulations

7.       The Pre-Election Phases    
   i)           Performance and co-ordination of the Electoral Agencies
   ii)          Registration of Parties and Candidates
   iii)        Voter and Civic Education
   iv)         Media and the Elections
   v)          The Election Campaign
   vi)         The electoral observation by the European Union Mission
   vii)       Domestic Observation of the Electoral Process

8.       The Events of the Election Days
   i)           General impressions
   ii)          Polling organisation and closing procedures
   iii)        Vote Tally and Tabulation
   iv)         Summary of observations by EU teams on election days

9.       Election results and the Post-Electoral phases
   i)           Contestations and Appeals
   ii)          The General Elections of 8 April and 3 June: Results

10.   Conclusions and Recommendations 
11.   Annexes     

8. The events of the Election Days

i) General impressions

The EOM-EU deployed 30 observation teams throughout eight departments around the country during the first round and 40 during the second. Observation was carried out at the polling stations, at the opening of the polling boards, during the whole duration of voting, at the vote counts and at the ODPE centres where the results from the polling stations were being aggregated and computerised.

During the first round, the EU observer teams visited and observed 351 polling boards. In global terms, the electoral day took place in a very positive way; apart from the problems detected at the opening and the closing of the polling boards caused mainly by the poor knowledge of the procedures, and in some cases by the fact that part of the staff had been selected among illiterate persons.

That the Peruvian people were able to vote according to democratic standards was largely due to the preparation and management of the electoral system, firstly by RENIEC in setting up a depurated voters' roll and secondly by ONPE and JNE. The general ambience during both rounds was calm and without intimidation. The Armed Forces and the National Police provided efficient co-operation, without any cases of undue intervention being reported.

Essential election materials, such as the voters’ lists, electoral records, ballot boxes, etc. had been distributed to the regional ODPEs in due time, with adequate transportation and security arrangements including escort by the National Police and the Army.

ii) Polling organisation and closing procedures

In both rounds, delays were reported in setting up polling boards as some staff failed to show up or were under trained – or not trained at all – because of a lack of interest. However, these setbacks did not vitiate the overall success of the operation, with citizens being able to vote freely and without intimidation.

Throughout polling day the MOE-EU observed that the staff of the polling boards respected the rules, including those treating complaints and challenges. In general officials, including those involved in the count, behaved impartially despite the inadequate training of certain polling staff and the intrusive tendencies of some political party representatives. In almost every polling station observed, party representatives were present during the whole day. Not carrying any visible accreditation, they were hardly identifiable and hindered in many cases the polling staff from carrying out their duties particularly during the tally of the congressional vote on 8 April. Cases were observed in which staff resisted and called attention to pressure from political party representatives especially during the second round.

Upon closure, EU observers were present at 30 polling boards on 8 April, and at 40 voting stations during the run off; they detected basically the problems mentioned before: lack of knowledge of mesa members about closing and counting procedures – especially when filling out the electoral records after counting. This originated an enormous amount of errors once those records were taken and subsequently processed at the ODPE computing centres; as a result, many erratic electoral records were rejected by the ONPE counting software and had to be re-checked.

During the second round a total of 405 polling boards were observed. As during the first round, polling boards opened late, always due to the same reasons; this time however the delay became a more serious issue because of the fact that between the two rounds ONPE had organised a second session of training for the polling staff (practically with the same content as for the first round), and here attendance was much lower than for the first round training. The reason given was that the convoked members were by now confident about the rules and procedures they had learned throughout the first Election Day.

Voting for the second round took place in an orderly way. No major incidents were reported. After the run-off on 3 June the count was executed notably more professionally, due to three reasons: the run-off election between only two presidential contenders was by its own nature simpler; also ONPE had provided simpler forms which meant an easier filling-in of tabulation procedures; and the polling staff, despite its lack of interest in the training, had already the practice acquired during the first round.

iii) Vote Tally and Tabulation

As required by law, the tally in the voting stations was not open to the general public. However, political party representatives, inspectors, supervisors and international and national observers were allowed to attend the counting and tabulation.

As mentioned, the recruitment and training of polling staff had been carried out in an unsatisfactory manner: the first because of the lack of transparency and accuracy in appointing the most educated voters of each polling board; the second because of the high rate of absenteeism at the ONPE’s training sessions. These two conditions did not help to ensure the required standard when handling the voting process at polling levels.

However, the general voting conditions, as far as the electoral climate during the election days, the voting procedures, the handling of the polling boards, the work of the ONPE staff etc. are concerned did not experience significant changes between the two rounds. Voting procedures were strictly observed and the secrecy of the vote ensured.

This affected also the relations between the polling staff and the political parties’ representatives present on each board, whose role during the second round was significantly less meddling when compared with what could be witnessed during the first round.

After the closure of polling stations on 3 June, the MOE was present at the first stages of the counting and computing process. The impressions obtained on the spot from the observer teams —which confirmed what had been already detected during the trial run— concerning the easier interface between the system and the operators and the rapidity of the new software used by ONPE (Top Level) for entering, collecting and sending data and producing on-line reports were all without exception positive.

On 3 June, the rapid collection of results (ACRA) from polling stations by ONPE, worked dependably and efficiently, despite reservations expressed by the JNE; the security of the records was safeguarded between the polling centres and the computing centres. The process took place in an orderly manner. Again the security forces played an important role in ensuring the overall security, at least within the observed areas.

The computerised tally of electoral records went surprisingly well, taking into account the huge problems detected during the various trial runs prior to the first round of the election, caused by the extreme, the complicated nature of the software. The computer program had been changed between the two rounds, resulting in a better than expected centralised computing and calculating. The MOE-EU did not observe any exceptional occurrences during this phase of the election. However, the mission observed small mistakes like energy failures and data jams; anyhow, these, on balance did not jeopardise the entire process at the departmental levels.

iv) Summary of observations by EU teams on election days

On the basis of the observation records received from the European observer teams during the run-off election (3 June), an overall assessment of what was observed at the polling boards can be drawn up. It goes without saying that the 406 locations observed - out of a total of around 92.000, countrywide - cannot constitute a significant sample survey in the strict sense. With this reservation in mind, the points raised nevertheless grant a tentative profile of how the voting procedures were handled.

·         The voting process:

Generally good and in order 87,2%

Minor problems observed 12,3%

More serious problems observed 0,5%

·         Closure proceedings:

Orderly and good 95,0%*

Minor irregularities at closure (Without effect for voting and vote count) 5,0%*

·         Counting procedure:

orderly 86%*

Minor irregularities (Without effect upon tally) 14%*

* With reference only to the 40 stations observed for closing and counting procedures.

While this overall picture confirms the position taken by all international observer teams, that the process was essentially well administered, permitted a free and fair vote and was without significant irregularities and impediments, some of the minor irregularities observed may nevertheless be noteworthy because this can be helpful in avoiding a repetition in future occasions.

The following selective list reflects impressions about the observance of rules set for the operation of the voting centres, the composition and competence of the mesa staff, and the presence and role of other personnel at the polling boards.

Polling board installation

Problems in setting up the polling board (mesa), delayed arrival, incomplete staff, difficulties in completing staff with suitable persons from among rank and file of voters...) 23.3

Opening of polling board delayed      32.4

Illiterate persons among the selected mesa staff          6.0

Voting procedure:

– Detected attempts to vote under incorrect identity       11.6

– Permissions to vote granted without the required documentation   3.7

– Attempts at “family vote” observed        12.7

Presence of party representatives and other persons:

– Unauthorised persons observed within voting station 17.0

– Political party representatives (personeros) present at polling board (one or more) 94.0

– Lack of impartiality observed in political “personeros” 10.3

In sum, the EU observers thus confirm findings by other observer teams that staffing problems at the polling board level were registered in a significant number of cases. This aspect appears to be the essential weakness of the Peruvian electoral administration at the grass roots level, since lack of instruction and competence by the three persons selected for each mesa to administer the voting procedure tends to open the modus operandi to undue “counselling” by the political party representatives who happen to be present when decision-making is called for.

In this context, it is important to be aware of the fact that the major two or three political groups are always at an advantage. While all 13 parties were entitled to position a representative at every mesa, only the major groups are in fact able to muster sufficient manpower to cover all voting stations, thus gaining considerable psychological advantage. During the general election on 8 April, in most cases, only personeros from Peru Posible and APRA were sitting in on the proceedings ...