Table of Contents

1.      Introductory remarks
2.       Executive Summary     
3.       Peru: Statistical Country Profile     
4.       The European Observation Mission (EOM)      
5.       The Political Framework    
6.       The Legal Framework of Peruvian Elections     
   i)           The Constitutional and Legislative Framework
   ii)          Electoral rights and discriminations
   iii)        The Structure of the Electoral Administration
   iv)         Procedural provisions for the elections
   v)          Media Laws and Regulations

7.       The Pre-Election Phases    
   i)           Performance and co-ordination of the Electoral Agencies
   ii)          Registration of Parties and Candidates
   iii)        Voter and Civic Education
   iv)         Media and the Elections
   v)          The Election Campaign
   vi)         The electoral observation by the European Union Mission
   vii)       Domestic Observation of the Electoral Process

8.       The Events of the Election Days
   i)           General impressions
   ii)          Polling organisation and closing procedures
   iii)        Vote Tally and Tabulation
   iv)         Summary of observations by EU teams on election days

9.       Election results and the Post-Electoral phases
   i)           Contestations and Appeals
   ii)          The General Elections of 8 April and 3 June: Results

10.   Conclusions and Recommendations 
11.   Annexes     

9. Election results and the Post-Electoral phases

 i) Contestations and Appeals

In electoral matters, we know that justice is summary and definite, its jurisdiction being confined to the electoral institutions. The Subsidiary Electoral Tribunals (Jurados Electorales Especiales / JEE) are first instances, and the National Jury for Elections (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones / JNE) is the second and instance of last appeal. However, as previously mentioned, there are cases in which appeal can be lodged with an international court.

During the past elections, the JNE has understood that the summary legal remedies foreseen in electoral matters are insufficient and therefore decided to accept all kinds of ordinary appeals. This may be seen as the principal factor in the delays produced between the first and second round of the presidential elections. The legal tendency to extend guarantees to satisfy all parties concerned prevailed over the interest of the public in a fast vote count, especially considering the present period of political transition. The government did not hide its worry about the negative effect such delay could cause both at the international and domestic level, but the present electoral system does not provide for any political mandate of the executive to interfere with the electoral administration, even if it were for concerns of the general public.

The JNE was conscious of its lassitude in the admission of contestations. For the second round, it has given the JEEs specific instructions to follow the strict legal time frame and other stipulations for electoral recourse and to leave all further legal openings to the JNE in its proceedings on appeals. In consequence, the electoral justice during the second round has been faster. The main reason for this of course, were the early recognition of the electoral result by the loser and hence a notably lower number of contestations.

The Constitution establishes that decisions by the JNE are not litigable (i.e. without appeal). The Constitution also specifies that “it judges the facts with conscientious criteria”. It can hardly be otherwise when votes that are not contested by the political representative at the mesa, are destroyed on site. Justice imparted by JNE is constrained to the necessarily arbitrary option among the discrepancies of the different original copies of the voting records. Due to this, the JNE failed to generate trust among the parties despite the extension of legal recourse.

There have been cases in the parliamentary vote of 8 April that point in that direction. The most symptomatic is the one concerning the last Congress seat for the Department of Ancash which was disputed between the second strongest political force (APRA) and the fourth list (FIM). The JEE assigned this seat to the FIM through a recurso de reposicion (appeal for reconsideration of judgement) which in theory was not applicable, but was in this case conceded. APRA appealed to the JNE, and the latter annulled the recurso de reposicion. Furthermore, even though it is not contemplated in the constitution and is not within its competence, the JNE submitted an expertise stating that one of the figures and a signature on a record favourable to the FIM had been falsified. On the other hand, the undersigned insisted that the signature was his own. The result has been that FIM has not accepted the last resolution of the JNE and adopted measures of public protest. In view of the characteristics of the case, the possibility of appealing to the Inter-American Court for Human Rights is being considered by the FIM-party.

 ii) The General Elections of 8 April and 3 June: Results

After an unusual delay of 43 days, final official results of the first electoral round were submitted by ONPE and JNE on the evening of 21 May. While the definite outcome of the presidential vote had been unofficially known for weeks, official proclamation hinged upon the complicated counting mechanism and the numerous legal claims in the aftermath of the congressional vote, which had been attached to the presidential ballot sheet. Accordingly, also the definition for the date of the run-off election - which finally was set for 3 June – had not been possible until 22 May.

The overall distribution of the presidential vote in the 8 April elections corresponded roughly to the survey-based predictions, but they brought the surprise of Alan Garcia surpassing Lourdes Flores by some 1,5 percentage points, thus eliminating her as a contender in the second round. This reflected a steady progression of Mr. Garcia in public recognition during the last weeks of his campaign.

 Results of the presidential vote on 8 April 2001

The run-off contest (3 June) presented the picture of a relatively close result between Alejandro Toledo and Alan Garcia. Already by end of May, the two contenders had regularly moved closer together, to the point of pre-electoral survey results indicating the possibility of a very tight squeeze; a difference of only 3 percentage points in favour of Toledo would indeed have created a psychologically difficult situation for the new government.-

As it turned out, a 6.16% advantage separates president-elect Toledo from the opposition candidate. Both had been able to considerably enlarge their voter reservoirs with respect to the 8 April vote, Alan Garcia showing the stronger gains .

Toledo:      from 3.871 mio. top 5.527 mio (+ 1.656 mio.)

García:      from 2.732 mio. to 4.887 mio. (+ 2.155 mio.)

 Results of the run-off election (3 June 2001)

After the final count Peru Posible appears as clearly established in the Andean and trans-Andean departments as well as in the Southern coastal areas (strongholds with over 60% of vote: Loreto, Arequipa, Cusco, Huancavelica) In all, Toledo obtained majorities in 17 of the 24 departments. APRA gained majorities in 7 departamentos and confirmed its traditional stronghold along the Northern and Central Pacific coast, plus the newly gained Amazonas Department (strongholds are: La Libertad, ICA, Piura, and Callao).

 Voter turn-out

As discussed in a different context of this report, electoral participation being mandatory, Peruvian elections have usually presented a comparatively high voter turn-out of more than 80% on average. During the 8 April vote, 2,64 mio. abstained (17,7%) and (not yet official) figures for the run-off on 3 June indicate an abstention rate of 22.7% (2.73 mio. voters), a relatively high number, if confirmed.

This development must be seen in the context of a prolonged campaign between the first and second round in favour of the protest vote, be it in the form of blank ballots or invalidated (viciado) ballots, as noted in Chapter 6 of the present report.  For a time, voter intentions had indicated inclinations of over 30% of voters in favour of such a form of protest. It can be interpreted as a sign of normality that finally 2.8% blank and 11.1% void ballots were submitted, but the attitude may have been reflected in a higher abstention rate. Particular care will have to be taken within the future Peruvian political set-up to win back for active participation the roughly one third of the registered voting public which this time had decided to step aside.

The Parliamentary election

The vote for a renewed Congress (8 April 2001) replaces a Parliament, elected under the old regime, which has had a life span of just over a year. All in all, 1340 candidates entered the contest for the 120 congressional seats. In metropolitan Lima alone there were 455 candidates for the 35 seats attributed to the capital region.

The following table shows how the political “re-adjustment” has dramatically changed the composition of congress , and partly restructured the party system itself.

 Parliamentary Elections: Composition of Congress in 2001 (and, for comparison, after the elections of April 2000)

As a result, the new political group Peru Posible of President-elect Toledo has become the prime political force in the country (45 seats) but falls short of a majority. Second in strength is APRA which thus has received an unexpectedly strong mandate to represent the parliamentary opposition.

Notable are the variations between the percentages of ballots obtained and the relative representation in Congress. In general, the major parties have drawn a stronger representation in congress from the special voting procedure (“preferential vote”), while small parties tend to come out under-represented.

Of particular significance is the clear rejection voters have reserved for the remnants of the political forces surrounding the Fujimori-regime. Instead of the 52 seats they had obtained in 2000, they are now reduced to three Parliamentary representatives (for the alliance Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoria 2001) and one for Solución Popular.